We prove that every key exchange protocol in the random oracle model in which the honest users make at most n queries to the oracle can be broken by an adversary making O(n 2 ) queries to the oracle. This improves on the previousΩ(n 6 ) query attack given by Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC '89), and answers an open question posed by them. Our bound is optimal up to a constant factor since Merkle (CACM '78) gave a key exchange protocol that can easily be implemented in this model with n queries and cannot be broken by an adversary making o(n 2 ) queries.
Introduction
In the 1970's Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle began to challenge the accepted wisdom that two parties cannot communicate confidentially over an open channel without first exchanging a secret key using some secure means. The first such protocol (at least in the open scientific community) was designed by Merkle in 1974 (although only published in 1978 ). Merkle's protocol allows two parties Alice and Bob to agree on a random number k that will not be known to an eavesdropping adversary Eve. It is described in Figure 1 .
One problem with Merkle's protocol is that its security was only analyzed in the random oracle model which does not necessarily capture security when instantiated with a cryptographic one-way or hash function [CGH] . Recently, Biham, Goren and Ishai [BGI] took a step towards resolving this issue by providing a security analysis for Merkle's protocol under the concrete complexity assumption of existence of exponentially hard one-way functions. In particular, they proved that assuming there exist a one-way function that cannot be inverted with probability more than 2 −αn by adversaries running in time 2 αn for α ≥ 1/2 − δ, there is a key exchange protocol in which Alice and Bob run in time n but any adversary whose running time is at most n 2−10δ has o(1) chance of finding the secret. But the most serious issue with Merkle's protocol is that it only provides a quadratic gap between the running time of the honest parties and the adversary. Fortunately, not too long after Merkle's work, Diffie and Hellman [DH] and later Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA] gave constructions for key exchange protocols that are conjectured to have super-polynomial (even subexponential) security. But because these and later protocols are based on certain algebraic computational problems, and so could perhaps be vulnerable to unforseen attacks using this algebraic structure, it remained an important question to show whether there exist key exchange protocols with superpolynomial security that use only a random oracle. 2 The
Merkle's Key Exchange Protocol
Let n be the security parameter. All parties have access to oracle to a function H : {0, 1} → {0, 1} chosen at random, where log n. The protocol operates as follows:
1. Alice chooses 10n random numbers x 1 , . . . , x 10n in [n 2 ] and sends a 1 , . . . , a 10n to Bob where a i = H(x i ) (embed [n 2 ] in {0, 1} in some canonical way). 2. Bob chooses 10n random numbers y 1 , . . . , y 10n in [n 2 ] and sends b 1 , . . . , b 10n to Alice where b j = H(x j ). 3. With at least 0.9 probability, there will be at least one "collision" between Alice's and Bob's messages: a pair i, j such that a i = b j . Alice and Bob choose the lexicographically first such pair, and Alice sets s A = x i as her secret, and Bob sets s B = y j as his secret. If no collision occurred they will not choose any secret. Note that assuming 2 n 4 , H will be one to one on [n 2 ] with very high probability and hence H(x i ) = H(y j ) implies x i = y j .
To analyze the protocol one shows that the collision is distributed uniformly in [n 2 ] and deduces that an adversary Eve that makes o(n 2 ) queries to the oracle will find the secret with o(1) probability. [Mer] . 1 seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] answered this question negatively by showing that every key exchange protocol using n queries in the random oracle model can be broken by an adversary asking O(n 6 log n) queries. 3 Since a random oracle is in particular a one-way function (with high probability), this implied that there is no construction of a key exchange protocol based on a one-way function with a proof of super-polynomial security that is of the standard black-box type (i.e., a proof that transforms an adversary breaking the protocol into an inversion algorithm for the one-way function that only uses the adversary and the function as black boxes). Indeed, that was the motivation behind their result.
Question and motivation. Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR, Section 8] mention as an open question (which they attribute to Merkle) to find out whether their attack can be improved to O(n 2 ) queries (hence showing the optimality of Merkle's protocol in the random oracle model) or there exist key exchange protocols in the random oracle model with ω(n 2 ) security. Beyond just being a natural question, it also has some practical and theoretical motivations. The practical motivation is that protocols with sufficiently large polynomial gap could be secure enough in practice -e.g., a key exchange protocol taking 10 9 operations to run and (10 9 ) 6 = 10 54 operations to break could be good enough for many applications. 4 In fact, as was argued by [BGI] , as technology improves and honest users can afford to run more operations, such polynomial gaps only become more useful. Thus if known algebraic key exchange protocols were broken, one might look to polynomial-security protocol such as Merkle's for an alternative. Another motivation is theoretical-Merkle's protocol has very limited interaction (consisting of one round in which both parties simultaneously broadcast a message) and in particular it implies a public key encryption scheme. It is natural to ask whether more interaction can help achieve some polynomial advantage over this simple protocol. A third, less direct motivation comes from quantum computing. In one scenario in which some algebraic key exchange protocols will be broken-the construction of practical quantum computers-Merkle's protocol will also fail to offer non-trivial security due to Grover's search algorithm [Gro] . Our results below suggest (though do not prove) that Merkle's protocol may be optimal in this setting also, and so there may not exist a fully classical key-exchange protocol based on a one-way function with a blackbox proof of super-linear security for quantum adversaries. We note that using quantum communication there is an information theoretically secure key-exchange protocol [BBE] , and moreover, very recently Brassard and Salvail [BS] (independently observed by [BGI] ) gave a quantum version of Merkle's protocol, showing that if Alice and Bob can use quantum computation (but classical communication), to obtain a key-exchange protocol with super-linear (i.e., n 3/2 ) security in the random oracle model against quantum adversaries.
Our result. In this work we answer the above question of [IR] , by showing that every protocol in the random oracle model where Alice and Bob make n oracle queries can be broken with high probability by an adversary making O(n 2 ) queries. That is, we prove the following: Theorem 1.1. Let Π be a two-party protocol in the random oracle model such that when executing Π the two parties Alice and Bob make at most n queries each, and their outputs are identical with probability at least ρ. Then for every 0 < δ < 1, there is an adversary Eve making ( 16n δ ) 2 queries to the oracle whose output agrees with Bob's output with probability at least ρ − δ.
Our result can be shown to rule out the existence of black-box constructions of a key exchange protocol with super-quadratic security from a one-way function, though we omit the details. 5 To the best of our knowledge, no better bound than theÕ(n 6 )-query attack of [IR] was previously known even in this case, where one does not assume the one-way function is a random oracle (hence making the task of proving a negative result easier). We note that similarly to previous black-box separation results, our adversary can be implemented efficiently in a relativized world where P = NP, meaning that we also rule out the somewhat larger family of relativizing reductions as well.
Correction of error:
A previous version of this manuscript [BMG] posted on the Arxiv claimed a different proof of the same result. However, we have found a bug in that proof-see Appendix A. In fact the current proof is quite different from the one claimed in [BMG] . In [BMG] we also claimed an extension of Theorem 1.1 to the case of protocols with an oracle to a random permutation (i.e., a random one-to-one function R from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} * such that |R(x)| = |x| for every x ∈ {0, 1} * ). We do not know of an extension of the current proof to this model, beyond the observation of [IR] that any m-query attack in the random oracle model translates into an O(m 2 )-query attack in the random permutation model. Hence our results imply an O(n 4 )-query attack in the latter model, improving on the previousÕ(n 12 ) attack of [IR] .
We also note that shortly after we posted the manuscript [BMG] , Sotakova [Sot] posted an independently obtained weaker result, showing that protocols with only one round of interaction (each party sends one message) and non-adaptive queries can achieve at most O(n 2 ) security. In contrast, as in the work of [IR] , in this paper we allow protocols where the parties' choice of queries is adaptive and they can use an arbitrary polynomial number of interaction rounds. 6 The one-round case seems to be simpler, and in particular the bug found in our previous proof does not apply to that case.
Our techniques
The main technical challenge in proving such a result is the issue of dependence between the executions of the two parties Alice and Bob in a key exchange protocol. At first sight, it may seem that a computationally unbounded attacker that monitors all communication between Alice and Bob will trivially be able to find out their shared key. But the presence of the random oracle allows Alice and Bob to correlate their executions even without communicating (which is indeed the reason that Merkle's protocol achieves non-trivial security). Dealing with such correlations is the cause of the technical complexity in both our work and the previous work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] . We handle this issue in a different way than [IR] . On a very vague high level our approach can be viewed as using more information about the structure of these correlations than [IR] did. This allows us to analyze a more efficient attacking algorithm, that is more frugal with the number of queries it uses than the attacker of [IR] . Below we provide a more detailed (though still high level) exposition of our technique and its relation to [IR] 's technique. [IR] .
Comparison with
We now review [IR] 's attack and outline of analysis, and particularly the subtle issue of dependence between Alice and Bob that arises in both their work and ours. The main novelty of our work is the way we deal with this issue, which is different from the approach of [IR] . We believe that this review of [IR] 's analysis and the way it compares to ours can serve as a useful introduction to our actual proof. However, no result of this section is used in the later sections, and so the reader should feel free at any time to skip ahead to Sections 3 and 4 that contain our actual attack and its analysis.
Consider a protocol that consists of n rounds of interaction, where each party makes exactly one oracle query before sending its message. [IR] called protocols of this type "normal-form protocols" and gave anÕ(n 3 ) attack against them (their final result was obtained by transforming every protocol into a normal-form protocol with a quadratic loss of efficiency). Even though without loss of generality the attacker Eve of a key exchange protocol can defer all of her computation till after the interaction between Alice and Bob is finished, it is conceptually simpler in both [IR] 's case and ours to think of the attacker Eve as running concurrently with Alice and Bob. In particular, the attacker Eve of [IR] performed the following operations after each round i of the protocol:
• If the round i is one in which Bob sent a message, then at this point Eve samples 1000n log n random executions of Bob from the distribution D of Bob's executions that are consistent with the information that Eve has at that moment (communication transcript and previous oracle answers). That is, Eve samples a uniformly random tape for Bob and uniformly random query answers subject to being consistent with Eve's information. After each time that she samples an execution, Eve asks the oracle all the queries asked during this execution and records the answers. (Generally, the true answers will not be the same answers as the one Eve guessed when sampling the execution.) • Similarly, if the round i is one in which Alice sent a message then Eve samples 1000n log n executions of Alice and makes the corresponding queries.
Overall Eve will sampleÕ(n 2 ) executions making a total ofÕ(n 3 ) queries. It's not hard to see that as long as Eve learns all of the intersection queries (queries asked by both Alice and Bob during the execution) then she can recover the shared secret with high probability. Thus the bulk of [IR] 's analysis was devoted to showing the following statement, denoted below by (*): With probability at least 0.9 Eve never fails, where we say that Eve fails at round i if the query made in this round by, say, Alice was asked previously by Bob but not by Eve.
The issue of independence
At first look, it may seem that one could easily prove (*). Indeed, (*) will follow by showing that at any round i, the probability that Eve fails in round i for the first time is at most 1/(10n). Now all the communication between Alice and Bob is observed by Eve, and if no failure has yet happened then Eve has also observed all the intersection queries so far. Because the answers for non-intersection queries are completely random and independent from one another it seems that Alice has no more information about Bob than Eve does, and hence if the probability that Alice's query q was asked before by Bob is more than 1/(10n) then this query q has probability at least 1/(10n) to appear in each one of Eve's sampled executions of Bob. Since Eve makes 1000n log n such samples, the probability that Eve misses q would be bounded by (1 − 1 10n ) 1000n log n 1/(10n). When trying to make this intuition into a proof, the assumption that Eve has as much information about Bob as Alice does translates to the following statement: conditioned on Eve's information, the distributions of Alice's view and Bob's view are independent from one another. 7 Indeed, if this statement was true then the above paragraph could be easily translated into a proof that [IR] 's attacker is successful, and it wouldn't have been hard to optimize this attacker to achieve O(n 2 ) queries. Alas, this statement is false. Intuitively the reason is the following: even the fact that Eve has not missed any intersection queries is some non-trivial information that Alice and Bob share and creates dependence between them. 8 Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR] dealt with this issue by a "charging argument" (see also Remark 2.1 below), where they showed that such dependence can be charged in a certain way to one of the executions sampled by Eve, in a way that at most n samples can be charged at each round (and the rest of Eve's samples are distributed correctly as if the independence assumption was true). This argument inherently required sampling at least n executions (each of n queries) per round, hence resulting in an Ω(n 3 ) attack.
Our approach
We now describe our approach and how it differs from the previous proof of [IR] . The discussion below is somewhat high level and vague, and glosses over some important details. Again, the reader is welcome to skip ahead at any time to Section 3 that contains the full description of our attack, and does not depend on this section in any way.
Our attacking algorithm follows the same general outline, but has two important differences from the attacker of [IR]: 1. One quantitative difference is that while our attacker Eve also computes a distribution D of possible executions of Alice and Bob conditioned on her knowledge, she does not sample from D full executions and then ask the arising queries. Rather, she computes whether there is any heavy query-a string q ∈ {0, 1} * that has probability more than, say, 1/(100n) of being queried in D-and makes only such heavy queries.
Intuitively, since Alice and Bob make at most 2n queries, the total expected number of heavy queries (and hence the query complexity of Eve) is bounded by O(n 2 ). The actual analysis is more involved since the distribution D keeps changing as Eve learns more information through the messages she observes and query answers she receives. We omit the details in this high-level overview.
2. The qualitative difference between the two attackers is that we do not consider the same distribution D that was considered by [IR] . Their attacker to some extent "pretended" that the conditional distributions of Alice and Bob are independent from one another. In contrast, we define our distribution D to be the real distribution of Alice and Bob, where there could be dependencies between them. Thus to sample from our distribution D one would need to sample a pair of executions of Alice and Bob (random tapes and oracle answers) that are jointly consistent with one another and Eve's current knowledge. Another (less important) point is that the distribution D computed by Eve at each point in time will be conditioned not only on Eve's knowledge so far, but also on the event that she has not failed until this point.
The main challenge in the analysis is to prove that the attack is successful, that is that the statement (*) above holds, and in particular that the probability of failure at each round (or more generally, at each query of Alice or Bob) is bounded by, say, 1/(10n). Once again, things would have been easy if we knew that the distribution D of the possible executions of Alice and Bob conditioned on Eve's knowledge (and not having failed so far) is a product distribution, and hence Alice has no more information on Bob than Eve has. While this is not generally true, we show that in our attack this distribution is close to being a product distribution, in a precise sense we define below.
At any point in the execution, fix Eve's current information about the system and define a bipartite graph G whose left-side vertices correspond to possible executions of Alice that are consistent with Eve's information and right-side vertices correspond to possible executions of Bob consistent with Eve's information. We put an edge between two executions A and B if they are consistent with one another and moreover if they do not represent an execution in which Eve failed prior to this point (i.e., there is no intersection query that is asked in both executions A and B but not by Eve). The distribution D that our attacker Eve considers can be thought of as choosing a random edge in the graph G. (Note that the graph G and the distribution D change at each point that Eve learns some new information about the system.) If G was the complete bipartite clique then D would be a product distribution. What we show is that G is dense in the sense that each vertex is connected to most of the vertices on the other side. We show that this implies that Alice's probability of hitting a query that Bob asked before is at most twice the probability that Eve does so if she chooses the most likely query based on her knowledge.
The bound on the degree is obtained by showing that G can be represented as a disjointness graph, where each vertex u is associated with a set S(u) (from an arbitrarily large universe) and there is an edge between a left-side vertex u and a right-side vertex v if and only if S(u) ∩ S(v) = ∅. 9 The definition of the graph G implies that |S(u)| ≤ n for all vertices u. The definition of our attacking algorithm implies that the distribution obtained by picking a random edge {u, v} and outputting S(u) ∪ S(v) is light, in the sense that there is no element q in the universe that has probability more than 1/(10n) of being contained in a set chosen from this distribution. We show that these properties together imply that each vertex is connected to most of the vertices on the other side, and so G is close to being a complete bipartite graph.
Remark 2.1 (Comparison with [IR] ). One can also phrase the analysis of [IR] in terms of a similar bipartite graph. Their argument involved fixing, say, Alice's execution which corresponds to fixing a left-side vertex u. As we noted above, if the degree of u is high (e.g., u is connected to most of the right side) then independence approximately holds and hence the probability that [IR] 's attacker fails at this point is less than 1/(10n). The crucial component of [IR] 's analysis was their observation that if the degree of u is low, then by taking a random vertex v on the right side and making all queries in the corresponding execution to v, one is likely to make progress in the sense that we learn a new query made in the execution corresponding to u. Now there are at most n new queries to learn, and hence if we sample much more than n queries then in most of them we're in the high degree case. This potential/charging argument inherently requires sampling all queries of the execution, rather than only the heavy ones, hence incurring a cost of at least n 2 queries per round or n 3 queries total. It also seems harder to generalize this argument to protocols that are not in normal form, which is the reason their attacker for general protocols requiredΩ(n 6 ) queries.
Our attacker
We consider a key exchange protocol Π in which Alice and Bob first toss coins r A and r B and then run Π using access to a random oracle H that is a random function from {0, 1} to {0, 1} for some ∈ N. We assume that the protocol proceeds in some finite number of rounds, and no party asks the same query twice. In round k, if k is odd then Alice makes some number of queries and sends a message to Bob (and then Eve asks some oracle queries), and if k is even then Bob makes some queries and sends a message to Alice (and then Eve asks some oracle queries). At the end of the protocol Alice obtains an output string s A and Bob obtains an output string s B . We assume that there is some constant ρ > 0 such that Pr[s A = s B ] ≥ ρ, where the probability is over the coin tosses of Alice and Bob and the randomness of the oracle. We will establish Theorem 1.1 by proving that an attacker can make O(n 2 ) queries to learn s B with probability arbitrarily close to ρ.
In this section we describe an attacking algorithm that allows Eve to find a set of size O(n 2 ) that contains all the queries asked by Alice and Bob in the random oracle model. This attack is analyzed in Section 4 to show that it is successful in finding all intersection queries and is efficient (i.e., will not ask more than O(n 2 ) many queries). As was shown by Impagliazzo and Rudich, it not hard to use this set to obtain the actual secret.
Attacking algorithm
We start by showing that an attacker can find all the intersection queries (those asked by both Alice and Bob) with high probability. It turns out that this is the main step in showing that an attacker can find the secret with high probability (see Section 5.2 below). Theorem 3.1. Let Π be a key exchange protocol in the random oracle model in which Alice and Bob ask at most n oracle queries each. Then for every 0 < δ < 1 there is an adversary Eve who has access to the messages sent between Alice and Bob and asks at most ( 13n δ ) 2 number of queries such that Eve's queries contain all the intersection queries of Alice and Bob with probability at least 1 − δ. Letting = δ/13, our attack can be described in one sentence as follows:
As long as there exists a string q such that conditioned on Eve's current knowledge and assuming that no intersection query was missed so far, the probability that q was asked in the past (by either Alice or Bob) is at least /n, Eve makes the query q to the oracle.
To describe the attack more formally, we need to introduce some notation. We fix n to be the number of oracle queries asked by Alice and Bob and assume without loss of generality that all the queries are of length = (n) for some ∈ N. We will make the simplifying assumption that the protocol is in normal form-that is, at every round of the protocol Alice or Bob make exactly one query to the oracle (and hence there are 2n rounds). Later in Section 5.1 we will show how our analysis extends to protocols that are not of this form. Below and throughout the paper, we often identify a distribution D with a random variable distributed according to D.
Executions and the distribution EX EC. A (full) execution of Alice, Bob, and Eve can be described by a tuple (r A , r B , H) where r A denotes Alice's random tape, r B denotes Bob's random tape, and H is the random oracle (note that Eve is deterministic). We denote by EX EC the distribution over (full) executions that is obtained by running the algorithms for Alice, Bob and Eve with uniformly chosen random tapes and a random oracle. A partial execution is an execution truncated at a certain point in time (that is, the transcripts contain only the oracle answers for queries that are asked up to that point). For any partial execution we denote by M the sequence of messages sent between Alice and Bob till that moment, and denote by I the set of oracle query/answer pairs known to Eve. We define Alice's view in the execution to be the tuple A = (r A , H A , M ) where r A are Alice's coins and H A is the concatenation of oracle answers to Alice's queries. Similarly Bob's view is the tuple B = (r B , H B , M ). Below we will only consider Alice's and Bob's view conditioned on a fixed value of M and hence we drop M from these tuples and let A = (r A , H A ) and B = (r B , H B ) . Q(B) ) be the set of queries asked by Alice (resp. Bob) which are specified by Alice's view A (resp. Bob's view B). Therefore Good(M, I) is the same as Q(A) ∩ Q(B) ⊂ Q(I) where Q(I) is the set of queries of I (note that I is a set of query/answser pairs). We define the distribution GEX EC(M, I) to be the distribution EX EC(M, I) conditioned on Good(M, I).
Eve's algorithm. The attacker Eve's algorithm is specified as follows. It is parameterized by some constant > 0 which we assume is smaller than 1/10. At any point in the execution, if M is the sequence of messages Eve observed so far and I is the query/answer pairs she learned so far, Eve computes for every q ∈ {0, 1} the probability p q that q appears as a query in a random execution in GEX EC(M, I). If p q > /n then Eve asks q from the oracle and adds q and its answer to I. (If there is more than one such q then Eve asks the lexicographically first one.) Eve continues in this way until there is no additional query she can ask, at which point she waits until she gets new information (i.e., observes a new message sent between Alice and Bob).
Note that Eve's algorithm above may ask much more than n 2 queries. However, we will show that the probability that Eve asks more than n 2 / 2 queries is bounded by O( ), and hence we can stop Eve after asking this many queries without changing significantly her success probability.
Remark 3.2. The attacking algorithm above is not computationally efficient, as in general computing the probability distribution GEX EC(M, I) could be a hard problem since it involves "inverting" the algorithms of Alice and Bob to a certain extent. But because computing these probabilities is in #P, we can use known techniques (e.g., [BGP] ) to approximate them with arbitrarily good precision using an NP-oracle. In particular this means that our attacker (as was the case in previous works) is computationally efficient in a relativized world in which P = NP, and hence this result also rules out relativizing reductions from one-way functions to key exchange that achieve ω(n 2 ) security (when this is formalized as mentioned in Footnote 5, identifying running time with number of calls to the one-way function).
4 Analysis of attack: proof of Theorem 3.1
We now go over the proof of Theorem 3.1. For i ∈ [2n], define the event Fail i to be the event that the query made at the i th round is an intersection query but is not contained in the set I of query/answer pairs known by Eve, and moreover that this is the first query satisfying this condition. Let the event Fail = i Fail i be the event that at some point an intersection query is missed by Eve, and let the event Long be that Eve makes more than n 2 / 2 queries. By setting = δ/13 and stopping Eve after n 2 / 2 queries, Theorem 3.1 immediately follows from the following two lemmas: 
That is, the probability that Fail i happens is at most 3 2n conditioning on Eve's information equalling (M, I), Bob's view of the execution equalling B and Good(M, I).
We fist see why Lemma 4.3 implies Lemma 4.1. Proof. We will show that for every pair of Alice /Bob views (A, B) in the probability space EX EC(M, I) that satisfy the event Good(M, I), Pr GEX EC(M,I) [(A, B) EC(A, B) ), if (A, B) happens, it makes the event Good(M, I) hold, and so we have The denominator of the righthand side is only dependent on M and I. The numerator is equal to
Proof of Lemma
The reason is that the necessary and sufficient condition that (A = (r A , H A ), B = (r B , H B ) , M, I) happens is that when we choose an execution (r A , r B , H ) then r A = r A , r B = r B and H is consistent on the queries in Q(A) ∪ Q(B) ∪ Q(I) with the answers specified in H A , H B , I. Note that this will ensure that Alice and Bob will indeed produce the transcript M . Let Graph characterization. This product characterization implies that we can think of GEX EC as a distribution over random edges of some bipartite graph G. Using some insights on the way this graph is defined, and the definition of our attacking algorithm, we will show that every vertex in G is connected to most of the vertices on the other side. We then show that this implies that Bob's chance of asking a query outside of I that was asked before by Alice is bounded by O( /n).
More precisely, fixing M, I that contain Eve's view up to just before the i th round, define a bipartite graph G = (V L , V R , E) as follows. Every node u ∈ V L will have a corresponding view A u of Alice that is in the support of the distribution A obtained from Lemma 4.4; we let the number of nodes corresponding to a view A be proportional to Pr A [A], meaning that A corresponds to the uniform distribution over the left-side vertices V L . Similarly, every node v ∈ V R will have a corresponding view of Bob B v such that B corresponds to the uniform distribution over V R . We define Q u = Q(A u ) \ Q(I) for u ∈ V L to be the set of queries outside of I that were asked by Alice in the view A u , and define Q v = Q(B u ) \ Q(I) similarly. We put an edge in the graph between u and v (denoted by u ∼ v) if and only if Q u ∩ Q v = ∅. Lemma 4.4 implies that the distribution GEX EC(M, I) is equal to the distribution obtained by letting (u, v) be a random edge of the graph G and choosing (A u , B v ) . It turns out that this graph is dense:
Proof. We first show that for every w ∈ V L , v∈V R ,w ∼v d(v) ≤ |E|. The reason is that the probability of vertex v being chosen when we choose a random edge is d(v) |E| and if v∈V R ,w ∼v
Hence because |Q w | ≤ n, by the pigeonhole principle there exists q ∈ Q w such that Pr (u,v) ← R E [q ∈ Q v ] ≥ /n. But this is a contradiction, because then q should be in I by the definition of the attack and hence cannot be in Q w . The same argument shows that for every w ∈ V R , u∈V L ,u ∼w d(u) ≤ |E|. Thus for every vertex w ∈ V L ∪ V R , |E ∼ (w)| ≤ |E| where E ∼ (w) denotes the set of edges that are not adjacent to any neighbor of w (i.e., E ∼ (w) = {(u, v) ∈ E | u ∼ w ∧ w ∼ v}). Now the following claim proves the lemma.
Claim 4.6. Let G = (V L , V R , E) be a nonempty bipartite graph such that for every vertex w,
By switching the left and right sides if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that (*):
On the other hand since we assumed that d(u) < (1 − 2 )|V R |, there are more than 2 |V R |d R edges in E ∼ (u), meaning that |E ∼ (u)| < |E ∼ (u)|/ (2 ) . But this implies
which is a contradiction for < 1/2 because the graph G is nonempty. 
The second and fourth inequalities are because of Lemma 4.5. The third one is because |E| ≤ |V L ||V R |. The fifth one is because of the definition of the attack which asks /n heavy queries, and the sixth one is because = δ/13 < 1/13.
Efficiency of attack: proof of Lemma 4.2
The proof of the attack's efficiency crucially uses the fact that the attack is successful. Recall that Eve's criteria for "heaviness" is based on the distribution GEX EC(M, I) that is conditioned on her not missing any queries up to this point. However, because we have proven that the event Good(M, I) has significant probability, queries that are heavy under this distribution are also almost as heavy under the real distribution EX EC(M, I), and have probability, say, at least /(2n). Intuitively this means that, on expectation, Eve will not make more than O(n 2 / ) such queries. The reason is that initially Alice and Bob made at most 2n queries that are unknown to Eve, and each query Eve makes decreases the (nonzero) expected number of unknown queries by at least /(2n). The actual argument is more subtle, and is described below. We say that a member of the probability space X ∈ EX EC is in the event Bad, if during the running of X, at some point we have Pr EX EC(M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2, where (M, I) are the sequence of messages and Eve's set of query/answer pairs at that moment. We define the probability space EX EC(Bad) to be the same as EX EC with the difference that Eve stops asking more queries whenever at some point we get Pr EX EC(M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2. (The behavior of Alice and Bob is the same as before.) Note that although EX EC and EX EC(Bad) are the same probability spaces, because the behavior of Eve is defined differently in them, the events Long and Fail are also defined over them is different ways. 11 However, because EX EC and EX EC(Bad) are identical as long as Bad does not happen we have Pr EX EC [Bad] = Pr EX EC(Bad) [Bad] and more generally for every event D whose definition might depend on Eve's behavior in the system we have
Thus Lemma 4.2 is obtained in two steps as follows:
Step 1. We first use the success property of the attack (i.e., Pr EX EC [Fail] ≤ 3 /n) to show that Pr EX EC [Bad] ≤ 6 (which means also Pr EX EC(Bad) [Bad] = Pr EX EC [Bad] ≤ 6 ). Note that ¬Good(M, I) implies that Fail i has already happened for some i, and so ¬Good(M, I) implies Fail.
Step 2. We then show that in EX EC(Bad) on average Eve will not ask more than N = 4n 2 number of queries (see Lemma 4.8). Since Long is the event that Eve asks more than n 2 2 = N 4 queries, by Markov inequality we have Pr EX EC(Bad) Note that ¬Good(M, I) implies that Fail i has already happened for some i, and so ¬Good(M, I) implies Fail.
The following lemma is implied by Lemma 6.4 in [IR] , but we give a proof here for sake of completeness.
Lemma 4.7. Pr EX EC [Bad] ≤ 6 .
Proof. Let's assume Pr EX EC [Bad] > 6 , and we will prove Pr EX EC [Fail] > 3 which is a contradiction. When we run the system and the attack, instead of choosing the whole randomness (for Alice, Bob, and the oracle) at the beginning, we can choose some parts of the system first (according to their final distribution), and then choose the rest of the system from their distribution conditioned on the chosen parts. The lazy evaluation of the oracle answers is a special case of this general method. Therefore we can do as follows:
1. Run the system till an arbitrary point to get (M, I) as Eve's information about the system. We pretend that till this point we have just sampled (M, I), and the rest of the system's description is not chosen yet. 2. Choose the "true" view of Alice and Bob till this point from their distribution EX EC(M, I).
3. Continue running the system conditioned on the views of Alice, Bob, and Eve so far.
The moment that we sample Alice and Bob's views in the second step of the mentioned method is arbitrary, and we can choose this point to be the moment that Bad happens (if it happens at all). In other words we run the game till the moment that Bad happens: Pr EX EC(M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2, and then will choose Alice and Bob's computation so far, and then continue the game. But if Bad never happens we sample Alice and Bob's computation just at the end.
Since ¬Good(M, I) ⊂ Fail when Pr EX EC(M,I) [¬Good(M, I)] > 1/2 happens for the first time in our execution of the system and we choose Alice and Bob's previous computation, Fail will hold for this running of the system with probability at least 1/2. So, if Pr EX EC [Bad] > 6 , then with probability at least (6 ) 1 2 = 3 the event Fail holds in the system at the end, which is not possible.
4.2.2
Step 2: Bounding Pr EX EC(Bad) [Long] In this section the underlying sample space will always be EX EC(Bad) even if this is not explicitly stated. Note however that Alice and Bob behave identically in EX EC and EX EC(Bad). Let γ = 2n , N = 2n γ = 4n 2 be as defined above. The following lemma shows that Pr EX EC(Bad) [Long] ≤ 4 where Long is the event of asking more than N 4 = n 2 2 number of queries. Proof. By definition whenever Eve asks a query, it is /n heavy in the distribution GEX EC(M, I), and since we always have Pr EX EC(M,I) [Good(M, I) ] > 1 2 in EX EC(Bad) as long as Eve has not stopped asking queries, therefore if q be Eve's query knowing (M, I) we have:
Define the random variable Y j to be 1 if Eve asks at least j queries and the j th query that she makes was asked by Alice or Bob before. Clearly j Y j ≤ 2n since Alice and Bob each make at most n queries, and hence
Claim: Let p j be the probability that Eve asks the j th query. Then E[Y j ] ≥ p j γ.
Note that j p j is the expected number of queries asked by Eve, and the claim implies that
γ , hence proving the lemma. Proof of Claim: Define Y q j to be 1 if the j th query that Eve asks is q and q was asked before by Alice or Bob.
Let O j be a random variable that whenever there is a j th query asked by Eve, it denotes the information (i.e., transcript and query/answer pairs) that Eve has up to the point when it makes its j th query. In an execution where Eve makes less than j queries, we define O j = ⊥. Note that the j th query of Eve is determined by O j which we denote by q(O j ) (and we define q(⊥) = ⊥). Let W j = SUPP(O j ) \ {⊥}, and so we will have: 
Completing the proof
To complete the proof, we need to (a) show how to handle protocols that are not necessarily in normal form and (b) show how Eve can recover the secret once she knows the intersection queries. Task (b) was already achieved by [IR, Theorem 6.2] (although we give a more efficient implementation here). [IR] also showed how one can achieve task (a) using a general "compiler" that transforms general protocols to normal form. However that transformation has a quadratic blowup in efficiency that we cannot afford. We now sketch how our attack can be extended to handle general protocols without incurring this cost; see Section 5.1 for the full proof.
Removing the normal form assumption
In this section we show how to get an attack of the same ( 13n δ ) 2 complexity finding all the intersection queries of Alice and Bob for a more general form of protocols. The proof has the following two steps:
1. We extend the result with the same complexity of ( 13n δ ) 2 queries for the attack to the "seminormal" protocols by a bit more careful analysis of the same attack given above. A seminormal protocol is a protocol in which Alice and Bob can ask either zero or one query in each of their rounds. Again Alice and Bob ask at most n queries each, but the number of rounds R can be arbitrary larger than n.
2. Any protocol can be changed into a seminormal protocol without increasing n or loosing the security.
Suppose i is a round in the original protocol in which Bob is going to ask k ≤ n number of queries (k is not known to Eve or Alice) and then send the message m i to Alice. In the new protocol, this round will be divided into 2n − 1 sub-rounds. In the j th sub-round (of this round) if j is even, Alice will just send the message ⊥ to Bob. So let j is an odd number. If j ≤ k, Bob will ask his j th query which he was going to ask in the i th round of the original protocol, and if j > k he asks no query. If j < 2n − 1, Bob sends also the message ⊥ to Alice in the sub-round j, and if j = 2n − 1 he sends his message m i to Alice. It is clear that this artificial change only increases the number of rounds and will not give Eve any extra information, and therefore it is as secure as the original protocol. In the actual attack, Eve will pretend that Alice and Bob are sending the extra ⊥ messages to each other in the sub-rounds and will attack the protocol in the seminormal form, and as we will prove she finds all the intersection queries with probability 1 − δ using ( 13n δ ) 2 number of queries.
Attack for seminormal protocols. Now we assume that Alice and Bob run a seminormal protocol in which each of them asks at most n number of oracle queries. We prove that the same attack of Section 3 finds all the intersection queries with probability 1 − δ using ( 13n δ ) 2 number of queries. We only show that the attack is successful in finding all the intersection queries and the same argument as before shows that the efficiency follows from the success property. Let BFail i be the event that Bob's i th query is the first intersection query out of I, and similarly let AFail i be the event that Alice's i th query is the first intersection query out of I. Proof. Let the event BGood i (in the seminormal protocol) be the event that when Bob asks his i th query, the intersection queries of Alice and Bob are all inside I (the set of query/answer pairs known to Eve). Let B i be the random variable denoting the view of Bob,till he asks his i th query and let q(B i ) be his i th query determined by B i . Also let (M, I) i be the random variable denoting Eve's information before Bob asks q (B i 
Finding the secret
Now, we turn to the question of finding the secret. Theorem 6.2 in [IR] shows that once one finds all the intersection queries, with O(n 2 ) more queries they can also find the actual secret. Here we use the properties of our attack to show that we can do so even without asking more queries.
Theorem 5.2. Assume that the total number of queries asked by Alice and Bob is at most n each, and their outputs agree with probability at least ρ having access to a random oracle. Then for every 0 < δ < 1 there is an adversary Eve asking at most ( 16n δ ) 2 number of queries such that Eve's output agrees with Bob's output with probability at least ρ − δ.
Proof. Let assume that in the last round of the protocol Alice sends a special message LAST to Bob. In order to find the secret Eve runs the attack of Section 3.1 and at the end (when Alice has sent LAST and Eve has asked her queries from the oracle), Eve samples (A, B) ← R GEX EC(M, I) (where (M, I) is Eve's information at the moment) and outputs the secret s(A) determined by Alice's view A. Now we prove that her secret agrees with Bob's secret with probability at least ρ − 16 and the theorem follows by setting δ = /16.
Let the random variables A, B, E be in order the view of Alice, Bob, and Eve at the end of the game. LetÂ be the random variable generated by sampling (A, B) ← R GEX EC(M, I) where M, I are the information specified in E and choosing A from it. (So s(Â) is Eve's output.) We will prove that SD ((A, B, E), (Â, B, E) [BMG] the parties' randomness had the oracle answers as well). Now as opposed to what we had in Lemma 4.4 (of this paper) this probability is equal to: Pr[(A, B, M, I) happen in Imag experiment] = 2 −|r A | 2 −|r B | 2 − |Q(A)∪Q(B)∪I| 2 − k where k is the number of intersection queries of Alice and Bob (according to (A, B, M, I) ) which Eve has asked that query later at some point. The reason is that for such queries we have chosen the answer randomly at two points (i.e., when Alice asked it and when Bob asked it), and then when Eve asked it for the last time there was no coin tossing for getting the answer. It is different from the case for other queries which, say, Alice asked it first, Eve asked it second, and Bob asked it at last. In the latter case we only choose the random answer for Alice and no randomness is used later. The term 2 − k makes the probability to be dependent on which order Alice and Bob ask their queries in the computation described by (A, B, M, I) . The positive (misleading) thing about Pr[(A, B, M, I) happen in Imag experiment] is that when we do not have necessarily Q(A) ∩ Q(B) ⊂ I, a secret intersection query for Alice and Bob contributes 2 −2 to the probability which can be divided into two parts 2 − × 2 − between Alice and Bob, but as we said for intersection queries that Eve also asks the query later the contribution of that query to the probability depends on the order that parties ask it.
Therefore, when we want to know the distribution of Alice in Imag conditioned on (M, I), if q is asked in Alice's view A and also we have q ∈ I, then A is less probable in the case Bob has asked q before Eve compared to the case that it is asked after Eve.
